In this article we argue that mental disorders have come to be defined according to a descriptive theory of meaning. In other words, mental disorders are defined according to superficial descriptive criteria that count as necessary and sufficient criteria for the inclusion of a particular instance under its corresponding class. These descriptive criteria are allegedly theory independent, leading to the assumption that psychiatric symptoms are directly identified in an object-like fashion. Against this view, we hold that a descriptive theory of meaning is unable to offer a proper account of the meaning of mental disorders both due to its own internal limitations and to the specific nature of psychiatric phenomena. Due to the hermeneutic structure of psychiatric practice, we argue that the identification and description of mental symptoms and disorders unavoidably depends on (frequently unacknowledged) theoretical assumptions. Since there is no global consensus regarding these theoretical commitments, and due to the fact that these significantly affect the final picture we hold with respect to each mental disorder, we believe that these commitments should be explicitly stated both in diagnostic argumentation and in theoretical discussions in order to maximise self- and mutual understanding.

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